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The apex of Socrates’ religious devotion happens in obeisance to daimonion, the 
negative sign of the deity that since childhood reduces his unwarranted speech or 
action to silence (Ap. 31d).1  It is his customary divine sign stopping his tracks when 
about to act in a morally reprehensible way (40a-c).  Daimonic activity brings 
Socrates to a halt grounding the moral force negatively; in care of the good it prevents 
by apotreptic and elenctic means what may cause harm.2
 
  Concurrently, daimonic 
intervention gives way to aporia regarding the superior wisdom of ‘the god’s’ 
preventive alarm and moral warning.   
Socratic aporia is ultimately oriented toward aporia par excellence the ever 
unsolvable aporetics of what the wisdom of the god might be; but, all aporias 
disclose a spontaneously emergent questioning of what human wisdom might 
existentially accomplish here and now in the moral domain—for the sake of others—
when empowered by theion ti, daimonion ti.3
 
   
In effect, Socrates’ philosophical questioning opens the world to an aporetic wideness 
of meaning mirroring the unknowable sign of divinity in the excess of its negative 
orientation impetus and moral direction.  His atopia therefore finds its genesis and 
topos in the radical interventions of daimonion that unequivocally frame and orient 
critical awareness and reasoned argumentation in the negative, reducing all rational 
and interpretative activity to aporetic questioning.  This paper claims that the 
daimonion, wholly asymmetrical utterly non-rational and mysterious, constitutes the 
crux of Socrates’ enigmatic profession of ignorance; it initiates his perpetual state of 
aporia through seemingly paradoxical activity that allows him to inhabit and 
creatively resolve moral tensions of self-other and society. 
 
Undoubtedly, the negative divine sign constitutes the axis mundi of Socrates’ 
religious-philosophical activity, hence his unequivocal obedience to its repeated 
apotreptic warnings to enter conventional Athenian politics (31d).  Notwithstanding, 
it is by non-conventional politics that Socrates’ divine mission becomes identical to 
his philosophical and social mission.  In effect, his notorious searches after virtue 
edify genuine concern for social justice driving his investigations to the public places 
of Athens.  As the city’s gadfly he constantly urges fellow citizens to take care for the 
soul, keeping it in a virtuous state.  His uncompromising dialogical passion for 
knowledge overcomes class boundaries and professions to include the whole spectrum 
of Athenians: slaves, craftsmen, and aristocrats; politicians, poets, rhetoricians, and 
sophists.  He works untiringly from within the thick context of the agora ceaselessly 
transforming ignorances into the light of day.  Thus, he confronts on a daily basis the 
confines of socio-political discourse, subverting ossified belief outdated norms and 
the reigning opinions (or doxai).   
 
As tradition has it, he is very much grounded in the community of the everyday 
roaming the streets of Athens barefoot in perpetual presence of the holy.  He 
meanders around the busy and bustling agora the meeting of roads mixing with 
tradespeople, labourers, farmers and cobblers, engaging and questioning people of all 
kind citizens and foreigners.   
 
He traces his occupation of doing so back to the oracle, the divine channel which 
disclosed his own ignorance.  His vocation as philosopher begins in divinely inspired 
‘knowledgeable ignorance,’ commencing as it where through single-minded 
contemplation of the Delphic pronouncement that there is no other man wiser than he 
(21a).  His relentless testing of the Delphic proclamation’s veracity initiates a 
perplexity and aporia which ripples outwardly -enveloping all and nothing- 
culminating in the firm realization that the negative divine sign gives rise to one and 
only certainty in knowledge, to one positive outcome: the confidence that the wisdom 
of the god is far superior to human knowledge: “it is really the god who is wise” 
(23a5).  
 
Socrates neither feigns nor assumes ignorance rather his claim to “know that he does 
not know” (21d3-7) is straightforwardly sincere.  He knows in earnest that he is “not 
wise at all” (21b4) although he is likely to be wiser than those thus far tested, only “to 
this small extend” (21d6): he does not think he knows what he does not; he 
understands “that his wisdom is worthless” (23b3) before the superior wisdom of the 
deity.  Effectually, his transcendentally direct realization of the negative excess of so-
called divine ignorance (unknowing), leads him to espouse the truth that his wisdom 
is worth “little or nothing” (23b1). 
 
His moral acumen bears the puzzling ambiguity and remoteness of the oracle’s riddle, 
is reinforced by the enigmatic otherness of the preventive voice of daimonion; both, 
foregrounding his ethical relation to others and otherness.  The alleged wisdom and 
ethos of every person (every other) Socrates encounters establishes his relation to 
otherness qua the deity; it is essentially an erotic relation with the radical otherness of 
the other.  It is a pre-ontological relation with daimonion with that which is other than 
reason in all ways superseding and enhancing it but not in conflict with it.   
 
Rooted in otherness, Socratic eros points the way to the god.  But the god speaks 
profoundly in silence in effect is silence-in-itself.  The daimonion either speaks by 
tramping Socrates’ action reducing to silence, or else speaks by its very silence 
through lack of intervention as on the day of his trial (40b-d).  Either way, the god 
grounds and confirms the good and virtuous ex silencio. 
 
This perpetual presence of the silent god (eros) and its daimonic interventions or lack 
of them makes Socrates recognize the magnitude of his ignorance, leading him step 
by step to apprehend his investigations to be “in service of the god” (22a4); his search 
to be guided along the pathways “the god bade” him (23b5); his elenctic mission to 
come “to the god’s assistance” (23b7); his incessant questioning to exemplify the life 
of a philosopher “as the god ordered” him (28e4); for it is “the god” that “has placed” 
him in the city (30e6); and he remained “attached” to it “by the god” (30e3); so 
finally, he leaves it only to “the god to judge” him (35d7).  Before the god’s wisdom 
all knowledge is in principle philosophically questionable. Only divinity itself 
remains unquestionable, precedent unknowable.  Thus, the deity is to be obeyed at all 
times whether it intervenes through daimonion oracles and dreams or any other form 
of divination (33c4-7). 
 
Socratic eros—ultimately “expressed by the element philo- in the compound word 
philosophos”4
 
—, manifests-itself as divinely inspired pathos for questioning, 
exemplifies the love of inquiry so central to Plato’s Apology (and the entire Platonic 
corpus).  Most importantly, eros (unceasing philosophical inquiry, essentially love for 
the god) draws divinity and virtue near, disclosing to humans their long lost 
humanity.  It bestows the gift of holy ignorance that utterly silent foundation of all 
knowledge and learning that grants the gifts of self-knowledge and scrutiny of 
circumstance.  Eros ignites (qua ‘wise or divine ignorance’) philosophical 
questioning elenchos and exetasis—igniting evermore thaumasmos, transformation 
and renewal—by founding and unfounding: positioning and repositioning, 
envisioning and revisioning, learning unlearning and re-learning.  It is the ubiquitous 
power issuing forth the moral force necessitating that one through critical and creative 
enactment question after wisdom, unceasingly putting to the test the ethos of what 
they professes to know.  
Uprising eros, the drive for knowledge grounds the philosophos between knowledge 
and unknowing, directing emphasis on unknowing—, the knowledge that one’s 
wisdom is worth “little or nothing” (23b1).  Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge, his 
aporia enthousiasmos and atopia issuing forth his religiosity and philosophical ethos, 
animate context and circumstance through constant inquiry of self and other: law and 
character, the plurality of perspectives, the manner of lives lived.  As such, Socratic 
ignorance igniting eros evermore, knows no bounds for unknowing reinvigorates 
ethos gnosis and episteme—paideia, téchne, politiké, economia, dikaio—making 
central the human and social dimensions of learning and community.  Thenceforth, 
Socratic philosophical activity untiringly questions through dialogue and direct 
encounter the maneuvers of uprising eros, grounding the ministrations of the moral 
drive (arête) in society and its political institutions. 
 
Socrates definitely revolutionizes knowledge by directly linking moral activity and 
arête to divine unknowing.  Association with the god issues forth the wisdom of 
knowledgeable ignorance: a kind of knowing-ness in unknowing; or else, the open 
topos of birth from which virtue manifests-itself.  Accordingly, ‘knowledge is virtue’ 
it ensues in unknowing and exemplifies the positive power of being.  Moral action 
and arête are neither solely a matter of cultivation nor can they be defined understood 
or comprehended by rational means; instead they are to be apprehended beyond the 
boundaries of the knowable in direct relation to deity.  Excellence therefore ensues 
directly from divinity, and the arena of testing arête foregrounds the mystery of 
dialogue and direct encounter against the backdrop of the opening of world and 
circumstance.  
 
Socrates’ negative manifestation of deity establishes that conquest lies not in 
knowledge: craft-knowledge rational scientific technical or technological knowledge.  
Rather, it lays in virtue the negative excess of neither knowing nor unknowing but 
that which bears a coincidence of both in the pre-ontological arising of form and 
formlessness, meaning and meaninglessness, the opening of world and wordlessness.  
Therein arête manifests in-silence the positive power that is knowledge.  
 
Socratic eros ignites arête by questing after the divinity that imparts it.  The early 
Socratic dialogues make clear that the question ‘what is virtue’ (either temperance 
courage piety justice) resolves in irreconcilable aporia. There is no conclusive 
essentialist or universal explanation of the nature of virtue; the question is not solely a 
matter of what virtue is but whence it comes from.  For Socrates, all aporias 
regarding virtue culminate “in the aporetics of what the wisdom of the god might 
be.”5
 
  This ever renewable question demonstrates the magnanimity of Socratic 
knowledge (albeit of ignorance) distinguishing Socrates’ call to self-transcendence as 
most radical, indeed making him a sophist more appropriately an exemplar 
philosophos initiating a substantive rupture with ancient Greek thinking and culture, 
perhaps with all extant knowledge and things past.   
His praxis in virtue, ‘he would rather suffer injustice than give it out’ (Grg. 469c1-2), 
outrightly challenges Homer’s and Hesiod’s mythological conception of justice which 
has Dike doll out good for good and evil for evil.6  He repeatedly repudiates banal 
sentiments infusing popular Greek theology poetry and tragedy that essentially turn 
the human into a puppet of the gods their elliptical, often unjust and conflicting 
emotions and decrees.  By contrast, he finds the superior wisdom of ‘the god’ neither 
rewards nor punishes; simply just humans well established in the truth of the deity 
enjoy virtue and all good things.  The virtuous person bears the responsibility of good 
and bad actions attaining a proper relation to the divine solely by their own efforts in 
philosophizing.7
 
   
Nevertheless, Socrates’ dialogical calling to self-transcendence, modeled in the 
negative after his daimonic interventions, initiates abrupt transformation in the affairs 
of the polis threatening the community’s norms and standards.  In promoting the 
“god’s moralizing agenda” he essentially opens “war with the city and its values.”8
 
  
Outrightly, he tells his dikasts (those upholding justice): the one “who genuinely 
opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from 
happening in the state,” will not survive for long (31e-32a).  And again: “who knows 
what that virtue is that is appropriate to a man and a citizen” (20b)?  Moreover, “it is 
not from wealth that virtue comes, but from virtue excellence come wealth and all 
other good things for men, both in private and in public” (30b).  As such, only the 
bios undergoing exetasis constant scrutiny and review is worth living: ho de 
anexetastos bios ou biōtos anthrōpō—the unexamined life is not liveable by humans 
(38a). 
Socrates never doubts the manner of his defense rather asks his dikasts to judge 
according to the law and their oaths.  He admonishes them: “direct your mind to 
whether I speak justly or not for that is the excellence of a judge” (18a).  But as it 
stands, he needs no external judges; there is divine confirmation for the goodness of 
his actions: the silence of daimonion on the day of his trial speaks for itself.  
Miraculously, 
at his trial, the apotreptic power of his daimonion is transformed 
into something extraordinarily positive disclosing to him ex 
silencio that “something good” (Ap. 40b6) which is the lot of just 
humans well established in the truth of the deity.  Socrates is able 
to die convinced that he never willingly wronged anyone (37a4-5); 
aware that death is no evil (40b6-7) for a just man but a blessing; 
knowing all too well that his accusers by imputing the death 
sentence will harm themselves more than him for a just man cannot 
be harmed by worse men (30c6-d2); convinced “that a good man 
cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are 
not neglected by the gods” (41d2).  The complete lack of 
intervention by daimonion before and during his trial confirms 
circumstance and the rightness of his defence demonstrating his 
adamantine faith in that “something good” (40b1) initiated through 
the silence of divinity (40d4-5), the good that his enacted piety 
brought forth and his philosophising attested to and was an 
elucidation of.9
 
   
Mostly, eros for the good in the Socratic sense points the way to the highest 
philosophic ethos, transforming us into better citizens and serious political 
philosophers.10
The paradox is that the philosopher’s vision of truth is, as Socrates 
demonstrates, private and singular, but it must be tested in public 
before the court of opinion. Socrates tries to convince the Athenian 
court that his private vision contains a universal truth. His failure 
to do so exemplifies the conflict between philosophy and politics, 
but it did not exempt him from obeying the law. The soul of the 
philosopher may be singular, but as a citizen, the inhabitant of a 
body, the philosopher is a member of the plurality, the polis. When 
Socrates refused to flee Athens and escape his sentence, he 
confirmed that private persons cannot contravene the law.
  Ultimately, Socrates’ way of facing death first generates politike 
philosophia radically accentuating the primeval paradox between the individual and 
community values, a paradox still very alive and unresolved in our pluralistic 




 Similarly, Eva T.H. Brann, in Paradoxes of Education in a Republic says:  
In extremis, radical reflection and civic reverence might indeed 
appear to be irreconcilable, yet the founder of all inquiry 
reconciled them precisely in his death: He was condemned to die 
because he refused to cease asking questions, and he was executed 
because he declined to flout his city’s laws by running away.12
  
 
The universal truth of Socrates’ religico-philosophical activity poses a perennial 
challenge to subsequent political philosophy.  By accepting death and the obvious 
limit of law (nomos) he resolves perhaps once and for all the paradoxes of ‘private-
singular’ ‘communal-plural,’ bringing a coincidentia oppositorum between ‘radical 
reflection’ and ‘civic reverence’.  Most notably, his daimonic religiosity empowered 
by divine eros overcomes in power of insight the collective nomoi and archai of the 
polis.  However, as dikaios polites bearing the weight of a purposive telos he 
succumbs to the limit of nomos though at once surpasses it by far in fearless stance.  
He opts for death favoring the greater moral demand and ethos of philosophic truth 
and justice13
 
: thus acts decisively for the good of the polis and the human collective 
more generally. 
Saunders says that for “Socrates philosophy is morals, philosophy is politics, and 
philosophy is life”.14  But life not a value-in-itself is divine eros, that unknowable yet 
miraculous power igniting aporia: the moral drive for knowledge at the very heart of 
humanity.  Precisely, Socratic eros (translating to politics of transformation 
accomplished by non-conventional political means15
 
), grounds that inwardly directed 
moral power dedicated to the advancement of philosophical paideia and culture for 
the sole betterment of society.   
Socrates’ ceaseless inquiry was not reserved for his own benefit or for his inner circle 
of friends it rather aimed at benefiting his fellow citizens and transforming humanity 
at large.  Hence, Socratic philosophical questioning bequeaths a lifelong journey of 
transformative knowledge, of virtue ensuing from exetasis solely for the benefit of 
public life and the common good.  Of Socrates, Emerson says: 
When we consider how much this individual fulfilled the great 
duty which every man owes to his fellow men,—that of crowding 
into a little life the most extended benefit, and contributing the 
strength of his soul to the aggrandizement of the species,—we shall 
acknowledge that few men can cope with him.16
  
  
Socrates’ philosophical social-political activity is informed framed and given its 
orientation by his divine mission: that pathos of enacted religiosity aiming at good 
results.  He discovers the pathos for the good in the eros of everydayness 
inaugurating selfless service to fellow humans.  Ultimately, he heralds the truth that 
philosophizing must bear the internal aim of justice-for-all.  Hence, his 
philosophizing constitutes transformative inquiry for the sake of the community, 
requires that politics is informed animated and ethicized by the aporetic life of 
dialogical philosophy.  Here, critical consciousness backed up by daimonion works 
within the parameters of truth and unknowability to defend above all justice and 
freedom of speech and thought.17
 
 
Surely, Socrates bearing the torch of new spiritual truth causes a definite break with 
old habits, false opinions, outdated norms, ancient laws, and set doctrines.  His 
philosophical activity constitutes an internal affair between the individual and the 
deity appears to manifest-itself at odds with communal life.  But ultimately, it 
constitutes a movement towards radical interiority and self-transcendence for the sake 
of the community.   
 
Concluding, Socrates follows ‘the god’s’ bidding to assist the divine by benefiting 
public life through radical intervention and questioning: ‘a politics of transformation’ 
established in proper relation to the deity’s negative determination.  His daimonion 
promotes justice in fidelity to circumstance bespeaks the unceasing ergon of 
philosophical knowledge political ethos and civic virtue.  But mostly, the virtue of his 
paradoxical practice clears cloistered conceptions of truth reconciling in-itself homo 
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